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 This paper offers a comprehensive view of flight system integration and test (I&T) 
lessons learned related to mishaps and close calls, focusing on what can be done to improve the 
I&T process to avoid recurrence. Specific areas within the realm of I&T that are covered in this 
paper include: I&T team communication and training; design of flight and ground systems for 
I&T; planning and scheduling; configuration management and process documentation; ground 
support equipment and tools; cleanrooms and contamination; mechanical integration, handling, 
and deployments; electrical integration and electrostatic discharge; functional testing and 
troubleshooting; environmental testing and facilities; and launch site operations. To illustrate 
"real-world" lessons learned for I&T, examples from throughout the history of the U.S. space 
program are presented. Also presented are some best practices for I&T that can help mitigate 




“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” 
   – George Santayana, The Life of Reason (1905) [1] 
 
 The flight systems lessons learned presented cover all levels or phases of I&T, from 
subsystem and instrument I&T, through spacecraft bus and observatory I&T, and finally launch 
site operations. They apply to a variety of flight systems, from instruments and observatories, to 
Mars rovers and crewed vehicles. 
 The focus of this manuscript is on mishaps due to errors or omissions related to I&T, not 
to design, fabrication, or mission operations. This paper is also not a treatise on root-cause 
analysis, or on organizational or individual culpability for specific mishaps. It also is not an 
exhaustive collection of I&T incidents and lessons learned, as one would find in a repository like 
NASA's Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) [2]. Rather, it offers general interpretations 
of representative incidents based on mishap investigation board (MIB) reports, case studies, 
documented lessons learned.  
 For the purposes of this paper, I&T can be considered synonymous with terms like test 
and verification (T&V); assembly, integration, and test (AI&T); and assembly, test, and launch 
operations (ATLO). Further, terms like "should," "can," and "must" are used interchangeably, 
since the recommendations identified here are not considered formal requirements. Nevertheless, 
the hard-learned lessons from history should be taken seriously; the mishaps of the past must be 
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I&T: The Last Defense 
 
 Flight system I&T is the process or program by which a spaceflight system is 
mechanically assembled, electrically connected, functionally and environmentally tested, and 
otherwise prepared for a spaceflight mission. It has been said that I&T is the last defense against 
any flight system problems prior to launch. Instruments, spacecraft, and other complex systems 
need to operate for months or years in the extreme environment of space; if there are any 
problems discovered following launch, there is usually no means to correct them.  
 Unfortunately, I&T is also the project phase that involves the most concentration of effort 
with little or no time to spare, especially if delivery of subsystem or instrument components are 
delayed. Further, there has never been an I&T program that went perfectly as planned. Many 
unexpected problems discovered during I&T may ultimately make the difference between 
mission success and failure. 
 
The Concept of "Lessons Learned" 
 
 A lesson learned in the context of aerospace projects refers to a mitigating process or 
behavior arising from an awareness that usually follows an accident or "mishap." It can be 
identified by anyone familiar with the incident, including an individual, a project, or a MIB. A 
formal lesson learned is typically documented and vetted for reference by others, with the intent 
of helping to avoid recurrence of similar mishaps in the future. 
 Many mishaps, failures, and close calls in flight systems either: (a) could have been 
avoided had proper steps been taken during I&T, (b) were a consequence of actual oversights or 
mistakes made during I&T, or (c) problems seen during I&T that were left undiagnosed. Most 
have more than one root cause, usually involving human error. Common root causes include 
inadequate team communication, insufficient training, improper test or procedure protocol, and 
no end-to-end testing in flight configuration ("test-like-you-fly"). 
 The term lesson learned is, however, somewhat of a misnomer: Lessons from a close 
call, mishap, or accident can be identified, acknowledged, and reported, but not necessarily 
learned. History is replete with mishaps that could have been avoided, had the participants been 
aware of and heeded previous lessons learned. Some of the more infamous examples of lessons 
not being learned include the space shuttle Columbia accident. In this case, the lessons from 
Challenger on Space Transportation Sytem (STS)-51L had not been learned well enough to help 
STS-107. Although the proximate cause was different, one of the root causes was the same: 
Accepting recurring damage to flight-critical components as acceptable ("in family"), what 
Diane Vaughan termed the "normalization of deviance" [3]. 
 This normalization of deviance often occurs in I&T, as well. It includes practices such as 
relying on untrained personnel to perform critical tasks, frequently implementing non-standard 
practices that are unsafe, compromising process discipline under schedule pressure, and misuse 
or inadequate verification of ground support equipment (GSE) that interfaces with flight systems. 
Other common root causes of mishaps involve poor configuration management during I&T, not 
only related to insufficient rigor in tracking changes to documentation, but also a lack of 
discipline when it comes to modifying flight or even ground systems. Some I&T-related 
problems are more organizational in nature, such as inadequate team communication, or 
misunderstanding of team roles and responsibilities. 
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 Most lessons learned for I&T, however, can be broadly applied for any flight project, and 
across multiple disciplines. Regrettably, all valuable lessons cannot be covered in this paper, 
since there have been literally thousands of incidents, some considered proprietary and many not 
documented at all. It is hoped, however, that becoming aware of at least some key lessons from 
mishaps and close calls will help reduce the probability of recurrence. 
 
Categories of I&T Lessons 
 
 There are several main categories of lessons learned for I&T, under which many mishaps 
and close calls have root causes or contributing factors: 
 • I&T team communication and training; 
 • Design of flight and ground systems for I&T; 
 • I&T planning and scheduling; 
 • Configuration management and process documentation; 
 • GSE and tools; 
 • Cleanrooms and contamination; 
 • Mechanical integration, handling, and deployments; 
 • Electrical integration and electrostatic discharge (ESD); 
 • Functional testing and troubleshooting; 
 • Environmental testing and facilities; 
 • Launch site operations; 
 • Other miscellaneous incidents and lessons learned not falling into other categories. 
 Using these categories, the table in Appendix A summarizes some representative mishaps 
and associated lessons covering a wide range of flight system I&T lessons. It includes only those 
causes and lessons of mishaps or close calls related to I&T, i.e., not causes and lessons that are 
not specific to I&T. The descriptions are intentionally succinct to enable a quick-look reference 
for I&T, citing archived lessons and reports if more details are needed. Some incidents involving 
several lessons are cited in multiple categories for ease of reference. 
 
Team Communication and Training 
 
 Inadequacy of team training or familiarization with flight or ground systems figures 
prominently in many mishap investigations. Yet probably the most common contributing factor 
to mishaps and close-calls during I&T is inadequate, ineffective, or even nonexistent 
communication among the team. 
 A well-known example of this is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminstration 
(NOAA) N-Prime mishap in 2004, in which the satellite fell off a turn-over cart (TOC) during a 
normally "routine" rotation (Figure 1). The proximate cause was 24 missing bolts on the adapter 
ring, due to improper procedure execution. However, there were multiple root causes covering 
several categories mentioned above, including: team familiarization and communication, 
planning and scheduling, configuration management and documentation, and mechanical 
handling. Among the many reported deficiencies, the hastily planned task involved insufficient 
oversight and poor communication of team roles and responsibilities. It is instructive to read the 
actual MIB report [4] for details, including several "missed opportunities" to recognize the 
absence of the critical fasteners. This seeming blind-sightedness involves what the MIB cited as 
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a common error of highly structured, repetitive procedures, in which the operator has a narrow 




Figure 1: NOAA N-Prime mishap scene [4]. 
 
 More generally, any I&T team member should be trained to identify unsafe situations, 
and even feel comfortable raising questions if he or she suspects something is not quite right. 
Any team member should be empowered to call a halt to an operation (hazardous or not) in an 
unsafe situation. At that point, safety is the priority – first human and then hardware. Emergency 
procedures are then implemented, if needed. If a mishap has occurred that is stable (e.g., 
powered-off flight hardware is accidentally impacted), then work stops in order to assess the 
situation, record details, take photos, and notify management. No work should continue until 
approval is obtained by the appropriate team leads, as defined by the project. 
 Many MIB reports have documented as a contributing cause lack of team communication 
regarding suspected or even observed risks and potential problems. Many more mishaps and 
close calls were avoided, often thanks to the diligence of a single team member who took the 
personal risk to speak up. A good example of this was during Magellan pad operations at the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in 1989, when a technician was supporting closeout of the Solid 
Rocket Motor (SRM) Explosive Transfer Assembly (ETA) lines [5]. Due to unclear procedures 
and a diagram error, the lines were incorrectly connected to inert ports on the safe and arm 
(S&A) devices. There was also no cognizant engineer familiar with the S&A device present, and 
the plug on the inert port was not secure. The technician, who had concerns about the 
installation, took the initiative to research it further and verified that indeed the connection was 
in error. Thanks to this technician's diligence, Magellan's SRM ignited at Venus for a successful 
orbit insertion the following year.  
 Many other incidents in history could have been avoided had the advice or admonishment 
of technical experts been forwarded up the management chain, or even simply heeded by those 
involved. In the case of NOAA N-Prime, one of the root causes was that an earlier comment by 
the technician supervisor regarding the missing bolts was apparently dismissed [4]. Historical 
examples of advice being ignored include the shuttle SRB engineers' report of repeated "blow-
by" of the viton o-rings under certain conditions, and their admonishment not to launch 
Challenger the morning of January 28, 1986 [7]. History eventually repeated itself 17 years later 
with the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) on Columbia – admittedly a different proximate cause, 
but nevertheless a common root cause involving management ignoring the advice of experts [8]. 
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 A clear definition of roles and responsibilities is also important to ensure effective I&T, 
not only during the task at hand, but in the overall scheme of a project. For the former case, 
unclear roles may result in a critical task (like installing bolts) not being performed. For projects, 
ambiguous roles can result in a perfunctory approach to completing work, and a lack of respect 
for role boundaries among the team can affect morale. Any of these conditions can lead to 
mishaps or close calls. 
 With regards to team training, a safe and successful I&T program depends on a team that 
is well-trained and familiar, not only with the systems they use but also with the tasks they 
perform. It is common for mission operations teams to perform a series of ground simulations to 
be well-prepared for on-orbit operations. This same approach should be implemented for I&T, 
whereby dry-runs of critical tasks (e.g., prelaunch servicing) are conducted to ensure that the 
team is prepared, that procedures are accurate, and that equipment is operationally sound. 
 Once I&T begins, regular operations updates to the team, usually distributed by the I&T 
manager, can help to ensure everyone is on the same page. This can include the latest hardware 
configuration, near-term schedule, who is responsible for what, and resource requirements. It can 
also include specific actions for specific individuals, and a deadline for completion (the latter 
often left open-ended). An online shift log is also helpful, that can be reviewed by incoming 
shifts for any operational details. However, logs should not take the place of preshift and pretask 
briefings, both of which serve to inform those involved of current system status, any open items 
and actions, upcoming tasks, and potential hazards. 
 With respect to leadership of the team itself, the I&T manager must be at the same time 
experienced and trusted. He or she should not only have the responsibility of implementing an 
I&T program that meets requirements and schedule, but also be afforded the authority necessary 
to carry it out effectively. 
 Lastly, establishing a cohesive team that works well together may be one of the most 
important factors to ensure a safe and effective I&T program. Team building activities, such as 
I&T "retreats" or periodic team lunches, may be enough to help facilitate an environment of trust 
and camaraderie [9]. 
 
Designing for I&T 
 
 Many incidents, mishaps, and close calls can be traced to a lack of proper ground or flight 
system design that fails to mitigate human error during I&T. Examples include electrical designs 
that incorporate identical adjacent connectors, inadequate labeling of components, inability to 
verify final flight interfaces, and inaccessibility for tasks such as prelaunch maintenance and 
closeouts. This includes avoiding "blind" electrical comnectors or mechanical fasteners, and 
locating components to allow replacing nonflight units with flight units following environmental 
testing (e.g., batteries). 
 One example of designing for I&T that is not always considered is the ability to verify 
final flight mates of electro-explosive devices (EED's). This flight closeout typically involves 
installing an arm plug to connect an EED, such as a NASA Standard Initiator (NSI), and enable 
it to fire when commanded – usually a mission-critical function. Since functional verification of 
an EED is not feasible, a parallel test connector is required in the circuit in order to verify the 
final arm plug interface. Although the probability (likelihood) of a failure in the arm connector is 
low, the severity (consequence) of the EED not firing is usually high. Thus, designing into the 
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circuit a means to perform a final electrical interface verification during I&T is highly 
recommended, and something the author codified as a Goddard Open Learning Design (GOLD) 
"rule" [10]. 
 Other examples of designing for I&T is determining how best to layout GSE to access 
existing flight hardware, such as that required for prelaunch closeouts.  
 
Planning and Scheduling 
 
 Planning and scheduling for I&T might not be considered an area of concern as a factor 
in mishaps. However, several mishap investigations have cited inadequate planning and 
scheduling as root causes.  
 Most flight projects develop an I&T plan that covers all aspects of I&T, including I&T 
organization and processes, resource requirements like facilities and equipment, and tasks to be 
performed during all phases of I&T, from integration of individual subsystems, to integrated 
testing and environmental verification. Flight systems I&T generally benefits from development 
of such a plan, in that it helps identify I&T support requirements and ensures the project team is 
in agreement with regards to what needs to be accomplished,  how it is to be performed, who is 
to perform it, and what resources are required.  
 One example of schedule pressure that led to a mishap was on Gravity Probe B I&T, 
prior to transfer between facilities [11]. Gaseous nitrogen was erroneously connected to the 
guard tank vent line, rather than gaseous helium. This resulting in blockage of the vent line from 
frozen nitrogen that had to be removed, and concomitant schedule delays. The mishap report 
cited schedule pressure leading to overwork as a root cause. 
 In planning I&T in advance, estimates for task durations should take into account what 
can be considered normal I&T overhead, such as: cleanroom and equipment preparations; 
procedure development and approval; and transfer, setup, and cleaning of hardware. Beyond this 
standard overhead are unforeseen situations, such as component delivery delays, facility conflicts 
and maintenance, interface incompatibilities, and weather disruptions. There are also labor costs 
associated with late arrival of key personnel, cleanroom suit-up, pretask and weekly meetings, 
not to mention morning coffee, breaks, and lunch. There may also be union-related constraints 
that add to schedule overhead, depending on contract requirements. 
 Once an I&T flow and schedule are drafted, it is helpful to convene a project-wide 
meeting with all the respective subsystems to review the flow step-by-step and modify, if 
necessary. This "systems-level" approach to defining the I&T process allows everyone to 
consider the various aspects of what needs to be done, in what order, and for how long. The 
schedule will change as time goes on, but a more accurate assessment of initial schedule and 
resource requirements facilitates better planning. 
 I&T is intended to not only verify flight system requirements and mission readiness, but 
also to flush-out unknown problems which invariably come to light. This takes time and 
flexibility. Schedules, plans, and task sequencing often need to be modified on a daily basis or 
even "on-the-fly," which adds risk. Also, I&T tends to be more relaxed and less efficient early 
on. As I&T progresses, a team that has already been working hard for months has to work even 
harder to meet a delivery date. This introduces the risk of human error, as fatigue and stress 
naturally set in. Consideration of these potential schedule impacts is especially important, since 
I&T is usually left with only what remains in the project schedule after other delays, and thus 
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must recover schedule to meet delivery dates. One way to do this is to have "back-pocket" tasks 
ready as fillers when planned activities are scrubbed or there is otherwise time available. 
 Single-string teams can be particularly challenging for small projects on a tight budget. 
If, for example, a key team member with no backup leaves the project (even temporarily), this 
can delay schedule or introduce risk to the flight system. Once I&T starts, there is little time or 
available staff to train new personnel, or to rely on others (e.g., systems engineers) to fill in. This 
must be kept in mind during the early planning stages, including during proposal development, 
when I&T staff and budget requirements are being decided. Further, initial baseline schedules 
should be limited to single shifts, 5 days per week; adding shifts or days should be reserved for 
contingency later on. 
 Sometimes, a schedule originally planned as a serial sequence of events becomes more 
parallel to compress schedule. Regardless of what schedule changes are made, due consideration 
should be given to potential impacts on the both the flight system and people. 
 
Configuration Management and Process Documentation 
 
 The term configuration management, or CM, generally refers to the process by which 
something is maintained and/or documented in a known state. It can refer to either hardware or 
software (flight or ground), as well as documentation (drawings, procedures, etc.). Often, the 
cause of a mishap can be traced to a lack of rigor or discipline in CM, leading to confusion 
regarding the actual system configuration. 
 CM of flight systems can be particularly challenging for projects involving mutliple 
spacecraft, such as Goddard Space Flight Center's (GSFC's) MMS (Figure 2) or Time History of 
Events and Macroscale Interactions during Substorms (THEMIS) missions. For the former, each 
individual spacecraft had its own I&T manager, and the configuration of each was carefully 




Figure 2: MMS constellation I&T at GSFC [12]. 
 
 A good example of a lack of CM that resulted in a mishap, as well as of a well-written 
lesson learned, is the LLIS entry covering a fuel cell on the orbiter Atlantis damaged during 
ground operations at KSC [13]. In this case, a disconnected ground wire was not properly 
documented as a constraint to another task. A separate but related discrepancy was an 
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undocumented requirement to leave a vent port uncovered in order to prevent hydrogen 
overpressure; this lead to damage of several internal components.  Other root causes included an 
inexperienced team and failure to conduct a pretask walkdown. Ironically, a similar close call 
occurred just 2 weeks earlier, involving the same vent port on Columbia. In this case, an 
experienced technician caught the error in time, but the near miss was not communicated to the 
workforce. Thus, history was destined to repeat itself. 
 With regards to documentation, I&T procedures must be developed early enough to allow 
for proper review, approval, and release well prior to use. This is important to ensure the 
necessary resources are available and that personnel have time to familiarize themselves with the 
operations. Once operations begin, logbooks such as mate/demate and red/green (remove/install 
before flight) tag logs should be maintained on a real-time basis. This as-run record of operations 
and hardware configuration will be invaluable in case a mishap occurs. 
 Procedures that include any hazardous operations (including lifts) are consequently 
categorized as hazardous, and usually require review and approval by safety engineering. In 
addition, it is highly recommended to include in hazardous procedures detailed emergency 
response steps (e.g., power down, safing, etc.) as the final appendix, to allow ease of reference if 
needed. This is standard formatting for hazardous procedures at KSC. 
 It is fair to say that much of the documentation developed on flight projects is not value-
added in itself; the process of writing the document is often more useful in identifying missing or 
misunderstood requirements. Also, there are often documents that cover redundant material, and 
often half of the content is common "boilerplate" introductory material (that no one reads). It is 
instructive to note that the Constellation Program Master Integrated Verification Plan (CxP 
70008) was over 120 pages long [14]. The Apollo/Saturn-V Master Test Plan, on the other hand, 
was only 27 pages [15]. 
 For low-cost, high-risk projects, known at NASA as "class D," the I&T team is by design 
limited in size and resources. In this case, documentation, review, and approvals should be 
streamlined to enable the team to devote their limited time to actually performing I&T. 
 
GSE and Tools 
 
 GSE is often underestimated with regards to its importance to spaceflight missions. Yet, 
as the equipment that directly interfaces with the flight system, GSE can mean the difference 
between mission success and failure. A prime example is the GSE that was used to measure the 
curvature of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) primary mirror before installation, referred to as 
the reflective null corrector (RNC). In this case, the cause of the spherical aberration was 
incorrect assembly of the RNC's metering rods, including no staking of the adjustment 
mechanism and no postassembly dimensional verification (see Figure 4). Misconfiguration of the 
GSE setup and lack of independent verification resulted in a textbook case of spherical 
aberration [16]. 
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Figure 4: Incorrect displacement of HST mirror RNC, with interferometer 
focus on field cap instead of metering rod [16]. 
 
 When it comes to safety, inadequacy or improper use has resulted in personnel injury or 
flight hardware damage, as the NOAA N-Prime mishap clearly illustrated. In other cases, GSE 
considered safe for use had an unidentified design flaw that eventually led to a mishap. In fact, 
something rather small, like a bolt or cap, can cause damage or injury. 
 Often, larger projects involving full spacecraft or observatories develop a nonflight 
system testbed, also referred to as a "flatsat." The flatsat system is usually comprised of EM's or 
spares of the spacecraft bus avionics, interconnected in a test lab on benches. This test system 
serves as a surrogate spacecraft for testing command/telemetry scripts, dry-running procedures, 
and new flight software loads. Once I&T is complete and mission operations begin, the flatsat 
can be used to verify new command sequences and flight software.  
 
Cleanroom Facilities and Contamination 
 
 Cleanroom facilities to support flight system I&T include everything from portable 
cleantents, to large laminar-flow cleanrooms like the Spacecraft Systems Development and 
Integration Facility (SSDIF) at GSFC. Missions involving instruments with sensitive optics or 
operating at very cold temperatures (e.g., single-digit Kelvin) must be kept extremely clean 
during I&T. This usually imposes unique requirements such as: control of local contaminants, 
potential materials outgassing, and humidity; purging, monitoring, and protection, especially 
during transport; and special inspection and cleaning procedures. 
  To ensure that cleanroom facilities are available and certified before start of I&T, project 
and I&T management must layout, procure, develop, or reserve facilities well in advance. In 
some cases, an I&T facility is anticipated to be available for a project, but is still occupied by 
another project due to slips in that project's schedule (i.e., "squatters rights"). This has sometimes 
required the incoming project to design, develop, and certify a new cleanroom, at their own 
expense. 
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 Once I&T starts, controlling contamination is a constant challenge. Training of all I&T 
personnel, particularly for contamination-sensitive hardware, should be mandated. Also, a  
contamination control engineer should be part of the I&T team through launch. Unique 
contamination control requirements must be clearly defined and followed during I&T, and 
contamination levels should be verified within limits via extended-duration testing [17]. Special 
contamination control requirements are usually necessary for missions requiring planetary 
protection (e.g., the Mars rovers, OSIRIS-REx, etc.). This typically requires extreme bake-out of 
flight hardware, such as dry-heat microbial reduction (DHMR). 
 Foreign object debris (FOD) also figures prominently in mishaps and close calls. 
Although this is an problem emphasized by aerospace organizations to workers and mitigated as 
best as possible [18], nevertheless some FOD still "falls through the cracks." One notable 
example was on STS-91, when a main engine combustion chamber pressure sensor froze during 
ascent, risking a return-to-launch-site (RTLS) abort or a catastrophic engine failure [19]. The 
cause was traced to a piece of viton from a test plug inadvertently left in after a propulsion leak 
check. In fact, viton was noted as missing during posttest tool removal. But after finding only 
part of the missing plug, the problem report was closed, and locating the remaining FOD was 
subsequently not pursued. 
 
Mechanical Integration, Handling, and Deployments 
 
 Many mechanical integration mishaps occur during lifting operations, due in part to the 
routine nature of the task. However, crane lifts are still considered hazardous operation that 
requires both training and due diligence on the part of the team.  
 One lifting mishap involved the TOPography EXperiment for ocean circulation (TOPEX) 
/Poseidon spacecraft in 1992 [20]. The satellite rotated over 135 degrees while being lifted above 
a thermal test chamber, caused by an unstable lifting configuration. Although the lifting fixture 
was damaged in the incident, both the spacecraft and the chamber were spared. The MIB found 
that a stability analysis had not been performed, and that the GSE had not undergone a full 
review and dry run prior to the operation. 
 Once again, the NOAA N-Prime mishap can help inform future handling operations. 
Some related findings of the MIB include lack of proper configuration control of critical GSE, 
and no visual verification of fastener installation immediately prior to use [4]. 
 Deployments can be particularly challenging to accomplish during I&T since the 
structures, and the mechanisms that deploy them, typically cannot operate in a 1-g environment. 
Thus, g-negation fixtures are usually required for a full deployment test. Further, a first-motion 
release ("pop-and-catch") is usually performed after significant stressors, such as vibration 
testing, thermal-vacuum testing, or shipment. Regardless, verification of deployment function, 
both mechanically and electrically, should be done as late as possible prior to vehicle integration, 
to ensure at least proper release after all flight hardware (e.g., cabling, blankets, etc.) is installed. 
 Some mishaps have involved excessive loads on the flight system experienced during 
transportation and handling. Though seemingly benign compared to launch, shipping and 
transportation can impact flight hardware due to unanticipated differences compared to the flight 
environment to which the system is designed and tested. In the case of the Galileo spacecraft, the 
high-gain antenna (HGA) failed to deploy following launch, resulting in a loss of real-time 
science telemetry and necessitating significant mission operations work-arounds. It was 
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determined that the most probably cause was vibrations during transport that imparted excess 
loads on the antenna restraining pins [21]. 
  
Electrical Integration and ESD 
 
 Electrical integration involves not only installing wiring and cabling, but ensuring that 
workmanship and electrical interfaces are checked prior to connection with other elements.This 
usually performed via a safe-to-mate (STM) procedure. This can be done by using an automated 
STM machine, and should include power-on voltage measurements. 
 Common electrical errors contributing to mishaps involve mismating connectors or 
failure to perform a complete STM. The dramatic fire involving the Magellan spacecraft at KSC 
was a result of a blind mate to an active battery, and incidentally could have been avoided had 
the standard policy of not disturbing multilayer insulation (MLI) been waived in order to afford 
better access and visibility to the connector [22]. Other incidents of connection errors resulted in 
test failures. An I&T test failure on a Mars Exploration Rover (MER), for example, was traced to 
a connector that was recorded as mated, but was actually not connected. The root cause was a 
lack of procedural discipline to pause after each mate/demate and enter it in the log with QA 
verification [23]. 
 ESD events are also a common cause of electrical system failures (see Figure 5). Often, 
the failure goes undetected until much later (latent failure). Progressive level of integration 
makes it even more difficult to repair, with potential risk to other flight hardware. Implementing 





Figure 5: IR image of ESD damage on flight PC board. 
 
Here are some general best practices for electrical integration and test [18]: 
 • Only trained and certified personnel should route cables, and mate/demate connectors. 
 • Perform safe-to-mates prior to connecting flight hardware.  
 • STM's should be performed after harness installation and any modifications to cabling. 
 • Ground cable and harness connectors prior to mating to drain any electrostatic charge,  
  and verify proper grounding of flight hardware and GSE. 
    • Verify all power is off to the entire system (flight or GSE) prior to mating or demating  
  connectors (power or signal), both for safety and to prevent transients during  
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  connection. 
    • Practice proper ESD protocol, including establishing an ESD safe area (ESA) with  
  controlled and monitored humidity, and using ESD-protective equipment and  
  garments. 
    • Record connector cycling in a mate/demate log to track flight configuration and  
  connector maintenance.  
    • Use connector savers on flight connectors that are frequently mated and demated during  
  the course of the I&T program, to minimize risk of damage. 
    • Protective caps should be installed on all unused connectors, and should be ESD-safe  
  (usually black) when used on cables connecting to ESD-sensitive components. 
    • Disconnect meter probes and ground prior to changing functions or range scales, to  
  avoid any inadvertent voltage. 
    • Connections to EED's shall be measured for stray voltage prior to mating, using a  
  calibrated stray-voltage meter. 
 
Functional Testing and Troubleshooting 
 
 A key aspect of flight systems I&T is functional testing, which ensures that elements 
function together as a system prior to testing the integrated flight system. Subsystem testing 
should be performed sequentially, after mechanical and electrical integration, to help identify any 
anomalies that may arise; integrating and testing more than one flight element in parallel makes 
troubleshooting any anomalies difficult. All newly integrated subsystem interfaces should be 
functionally verified. Functional testing is also performed following significant operations, such 
as hardware transfer and environment tests. More detailed tests, such as a comprehensive 
performance test (CPT), are performed to exercise the flight system in various flight modes. Full 
functional testing should be conducted at each stage of integration or level of assembly: from 
component to subassembly, to subsystem or instrument, to spacecraft and observatory, and 
finally to integration with the launch vehicle. 
 Often, schedule pressures invariably result in conscious decisions by a flight project to 
reduce or eliminate testing originally planned, while still retaining a lot of project overhead. This 
differs from I&T overhead mentioned earlier, and can include extraneous documentation and QA 
monitoring, excessive reporting and reviews, and management oversight. More reviews and 
documentation do not ensure success; risk can often be better mitigated by conducting a robust 
test program. On the other hand, as has been seen, critical checks-and-balances should not be 
minimized to the extent that safety of hardware and people is compromised. An "incompressible 
test list" is typically developed to ensure that, no matter what schedule pressures arise, there is a 
bare minimum of verifications predefined that must be performed. 
 During testing itself, the test team should remain engaged in the task at hand. There have 
been several mishaps that were caused in part by a lack of vigilance. Today, this situation could 
easily apply to someone who is more interested in texting on a smartphone than monitoring a test 
system display for any anomalous telemetry.  
 Certainly, one of the most well-known failures in test and verification involved the HST 
primary mirror (see GSE and Tools). Interestingly, errors discovered using other GSE were 
reportedly discounted by the contractor as invalid. Further, budget and schedule constraints led 
to not conducting an independent or end-to-end test [16]. 
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 Another mission that was impacted (this time fatally) by a lack of end-to-end testing in 
flight configuration was the Wide-field InfraRed Explorer (WIRE) satellite. Shortly after a 
successful launch, an electronics transient to a pyrotechnic circuit initiated premature ejection of 
the cryostat cover, resulting in a rapid boil-off of hydrogen, which led to loss of stability and 
attitude control. Among other root causes was lack of fidelity in the test setup, inadequate 
troubleshooting, and incomplete understanding of an anomalous signal observed during testing 
[24]. A similar mistake occurred for a Milstar satellite in 1999, when data from not one, but two 
prelaunch tests was overlooked and misinterpreted (respectively) that could have prevented the 
loss of the $1.23 billion mission [6]. 
 Further, in troubleshooting anomalies, configuration of both the flight and ground 
systems should be maintained to help ascertain both the actual problem and the cause. The 
exception is when there is imminent danger to hardware or personnel, in which case immediate 
power down and other emergency responses may be required. Regardless, I&T tasks should be 




 Requirements for environmental testing vary with organization, project, and level of 
integration (i.e., box, subsystem, instrument, spacecraft, observatory, etc.). The types of testing, 
extent, and sequence of tests vary as well, depending on requirements and facilities availability. 
 Although environmental verification requirements are usually defined by systems 
engineering, I&T is responsible for developing the I&T flow and arranging for test resources. In 
general, the preferred sequence of the major environmental tests is first electromagnetic 
interference and compatibility (EMI/EMC), then vibroacoustics, and finally thermal. This is 
based on the idea that the less complex and stressing tests should be performed before those that 
are more involved and require more resources. Further, if a problem is encountered that 
necessitates a design change, it is easier to reperform a test like EMI/EMC than to reperform a 
test as labor-intensive as thermal-vacuum. 
 Environmental testing at higher levels of integration, such as observatory I&T, is not 
intended to verify workmanship of subsystems or instruments; this should be performed at the 
lower levels of integration. Another good practice is to have the flight system powered up during 
vibration testing to detect undetected workmanship or design flaws, such as arching, open 
circuits, or relay chatter [25]. 
 There have also been several cases where test chambers were either not designed to 
support the requirements, not certified, or inadequately maintained, including flight hardware for 
High-Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager (HESSI), Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment 
Explorer (LADEE), and Juno. Test chamber problems can not only delay I&T, but also cause 
potential damage to flight hardware or injury to personnel. In the case of at least one of these 
projects, an awareness of test risks and review of lessons learned from earlier sine-burst test 
mishaps probably could have prevented a similar recurrence [26, 27, 28]. 
 
Launch Site Operations 
 
 Launch site operations can be the most interesting phase of I&T and ultimately the most 
rewarding, when one can finally see the fruition of typically years of work in a fully integrated 
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spacecraft ready for launch. On the other hand, this time can also be the most stressful for a 
team, when 24/7 prelaunch operations in the midst of numerous hazards like propellants, 
ordnance, and heights can be very draining. Thus, this is a time is when everyone should be most 
vigilant to ensure safety of the team and of the spacecraft, while also addressing the inevitable 
unexpected problems that occur. 
 Following delivery, a full functional or comprehensive performance test is performed 
prior to encapsulation into the payload fairing for vehicle integration. It goes without saying that 
any late installations of flight hardware at this point introduce risk to mission success, since 
launch site operations are generally intended to perform just the minimum postdelivery and 
prelaunch tasks. 
 A final walkdown is also usually conducted by all engineering disciplines prior to 
encapsulation, to ensure proper configuration for flight. This should include inspection of 
cabling, thermal blankets and coatings, structures, mechanisms, instruments, and potential 
interference with separation or deployments. Other items include any remnant nonflight items or 
surface contamination. One example of a missed nonflight item was on Germany's TVSat-1 
satellite, when hold-down clips that were not removed prevented one of the solar panels from 
deploying on orbit [6]. In cases like this or even losses-of-mission, remove-before-flight logs and 
close-out photographs taken prior to launch can prove invaluable. 
 JPL's 4-month launch campaign for the Wide-Field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE), 
involving a hazardous cryogenic payload, faced numerous challenges, including the need for 
extensive scaffolding for 24/7 cryo operations, wildfires at Vandenburg Air Force Base (VAFB), 
utility outages, and pad space constraints for cryo GSE. Despite these challenges, WISE launch 
site operations were completed successfully without any major incidents. The team benefitted 
from previous lessons learned, and also conducted its own Post-Launch Assessment Review 
(PLAR). Below are several recommendations for successful launch site operations annotated in 
the archived WISE lesson learned [29]. 
Other Miscellaneous Incidents and Lessons Learned 
 
 Some aspects of I&T lessons learned either do not neatly fall into one of the above 
categories, or are so cross-cutting that they deserve special attention. Most notably is the idea 
that, due to frequently repetition or familiarity, a task involving flight hardware is considered 
"routine." This has led to mishaps involving lax procedural discipline or poor oversight [4]. 
 A tragic example of this was the Apollo 1 fire, attributed to multiple root causes, 
including what astronaut Frank Borman and others referred to as a "failure of imagination." The 
plugs-out test at LC-34 was considered routine and safe, yet it was conducted under hazardous 
conditions, in a spacecraft with poor workmanship, and multiple risks of damage from loads 
induced by ground crews [30]. It had never occurred to the test team that a ground test, even on a 
flight spacecraft on the pad, could be potentially fatal. 
 Likewise, any flight systems I&T operation has inherent risks to both hardware and 
personnel. It behooves each person on the I&T team to be vigilant and proactive in addressing 
potential risks to prevent mishaps and close calls. 
 Another problem that often impacts I&T are late requirements that were not originally 
planned for, such as additional testing or processes, or modifications to flight hardware or GSE.  
 
 
To be published in the conference proceedings for Space Ops 2018, The 15th International Conference on Space Operations, 




Some Thoughts on Human Spaceflight 
 
 Those involved with human spaceflight missions have a unique responsibility to ensure 
that flight systems are qualified and safe for human spaceflight. This usually includes some level 
of crew training and familiarization, as well as sharp-edge inspections to ensure safety during 














Figure 6: Author conducting a payload interface 
    verification test (IVT) dry-run with the 
    STS-107 crew. 
 
 Those involved in I&T also have the unique role after accidents, like Challenger and 
Columbia, of supporting investigations due to their intimate knowledge of the flight system. This 
can include providing information about what was done during I&T, and how any mishaps or 
anomalies encountered during I&T were addressed. This is when comprehensive, accurate 
records and notes come in handy. 
 For reference, Johnson Space Center (JSC) has developed an interactive database of 
"Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight," that is very informative [19]. 
There are also suggestions related to shuttle payload I&T in the author's "Integration and Test of 
Shuttle Small Payloads," (NASA TM-2003-211611) that can still help inform I&T of flight 
systems today [9]. 
 
Conclusion: Lessons on Lessons 
 
 As alluded to earlier, lessons are not beneficial if they are not actually learned. Unless a 
project (or I&T manager) takes the initiative to research past lessons learned, history is bound to 
repeat itself. Some mishaps, such as the aforementioned fuel cell damage [13], are a consequence 
of an earlier close call either not being reported or not acted upon to prevent subsequent 
incidents. Unfortunately, most organizations do not have a simple, standard, and well-advertised 
means of reporting close calls or near misses. Nevertheless, it behooves those who witness or are 
involved in a close call to at least report it, to avoid potentially more serious recurrence (if not 
regret). There are mishaps that occur for which details are not released or easily accessible. 
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Unfortunately, lack of communication regarding mishaps can unfortunately lead to recurrence of 
the same incident on future flight projects.  
 Some NASA centers like KSC have formalized the process of "recurrence control" (RC), 
whereby incidents, from minor problem reports to tragic accidents, are tracked for mitigation to 
avoid happening again. Sadly, RC is rarely achieved in reality: both the Challenger and 
Columbia accidents are testaments to a "normalization of deviance." Further, some existing RC 
systems have been inconsistently utilized in practice [31], and most organizations do not address 
RC at all. 
 Some organizations, such as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), assess lessons learned 
at the beginning of a flight project, which has helped lead to successful missions like Kepler, 
Juno, and MER. JPL also develops a "lessons learned compliance matrix" for each project, to 
assign and track relevant lessons from the lessons archives [32]. Following launch of its 
missions, GSFC's Flight Projects Directorate holds "knowledge capture" sessions with the 
project team to discuss and document lessons learned. 
 There have been several undocumented "close calls" and mishaps that this author is 
aware of from only a small percentage of NASA flight projects. One can therefore infer that 
uncounted thousands of undocumented close calls and mishaps have occurred throughout the 
history of spaceflight. It is conceivable that any one of these, had they been made known, could 
have been enough to avoid a serious mishap, save a mission, or even save a life. Therefore, it 
behooves those of us in the I&T "trenches" to not only review and implement lessons learned, 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
(For I&T Lessons Table) 
 
AC  Alternating Current 
Assy  Assembly 
ATLAS  Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System 
AVHRR  Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer 
BAT  Burst Alert Telescope 
BOB  Break-Out Box 
CAPL  CApillary Pumped Loop 
CM  Configuration Management 
Comm  Communicate, Communication 
Config  Configure, Configuration 
Contam  Contamination 
DC  Direct Current, Douglas Commercial 
Doc  Document, Documentation 
DS  Deep Space 
E2E  End-to-end (test) 
EED  Electro-Explosive Device 
EFE  Environmental Control and Life Support System Flight Experiment 
EM  Engineering Model 
EMI  Electromagnetic Interference 
EMOS  Environmental Monitors on Station 
EPP  Exploration Payloads Project 
ESD  Electrostatic Discharge 
Esp  Especially 
Ext  External, Exterior 
FOD  Foreign Object Debris 
FOT  Flight Operations Team 
FREESTAR Fast-Reaction Experiments Enabling Science, Technology, And Research 
FSW   Flight Software 
g  Gravity 
GCP  Glo-Cryo Payload 
GEDI  Global Ecosystems Dynamics Investigation 
GP-B  Gravity Probe B 
GPM  Global Precipitation Measurement 
Grd  Ground 
GSE  Ground Support Equipment 
HESSI   High-Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager 
HGA  High-Gain Antenna 
HGAS  High-Gain Antenna System 
HST  Hubble Space Telescope 
HUT  Hopkins Ultraviolet Telescope 
H/W  Hardware 
I&T  Integration and Test 
ICD  Interface Control Document 
IEH  International Extreme-ultraviolet Hitchhiker 
Incl  Include, Including 
Info  Information 
Instr  Instrument 
IPA  Isopropyl Alcohol 
IRAS  InfraRed Astronomical Satellite 
ISS  International Space Station 
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IT  Information Technology 
IUS  Inertial Upper Stage 
IVT  Interface Verification Test 
JSC  Johnson Space Center 
KICS  Kennedy Integrated Control Schedule 
KSC  Kennedy Space Center 
LADEE  Lunar Atmosphere Dust Environment Explorer 
LC  Launch Complex 
LCC  Launch Control Center 
LDCM  LandSat Data Continuity Mission 
LGA  Low-Gain Antenna 
LiOH  Lithium Hydroxide 
LPS  Launch Processing System 
LRO  Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
MCO  Mars Climate Orbiter 
MER  Mars Exploration Rover 
MGA  Medium-Gain Antenna 
Mgmt  Management 
Mgr  Manager 
MGS  Mars Global Surveyor 
MGSE  Mechanical Ground Support Equipment 
MLI  MultiLayer Insulation 
Mod  Modification 
MPL  Mars Polar Lander 
MSL  Mars Science Laboratory 
MST  Mission Sequence Test 
MT   Mobile Transporter 
N/A  Not Applicable 
Navcam  Navigation Camera 
NICER  Neutron star Interior Composition Explorer 
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminstration 
OCO  Orbiting Carbon Observatory 
ODERACS Orbital DEbris RAdar Calibration Spheres 
Op  Operation, Operational 
OPF  Orbiter Processing Facility 
OSIRIS-REx Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, and Security Regolith Explorer  
OT  Overtime 
OV  Orbiter Vehicle 
PCR  Payload Changeout Room 
P/L  Payload 
Prep  Prepare, Preparation 
Proc  Procedure, Procedural 
P/S  Power Supply 
Pyro  Pyrotechnic 
QA  Quality Assurance 
Qual  Qualification 
Req'd  Required 
RTLS  Return-To-Launch-Site (Abort) 
S&A  Safe and Arm 
SAD  Solar Array Drive 
SAGE  Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment 
SAM  Sample Analysis at Mars 
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SAMPEX Solar Anomalous Magnetospheric Particle Explorer 
S/C  Spacecraft 
SE  Systems Engineer, Systems Engineering 
SEH  Solar Extreme-ultraviolet Hitchhiker 
SIRTF  Space Infrared Telescope Facility 
SRA  Search and Rescue Antenna 
SRM  Solid Rocket Motor 
S/S  Subsystem 
SSME  Space Shuttle Main Engine 
ST  Space Technology 
STM  Safe-To-Mate (Procedure) 
STS  Space Transportation System 
S/W  Software 
TAS  Technology, Applications, and Science 
TC  Test Conductor 
Tech  Technician 
Temp  Temperature 
TIRS  Transverse Impulse Rocket System 
TLS  Tunable Laser Spectrometer 
TOC  Turn-Over Cart 
TOPEX   TOPography EXperiment for ocean circulation 
TRR  Test Readiness Review 
T'vac  Thermal-Vacuum (test) 
UPS  Uninterruptable Power Supply 
USML  United States Microgravity Laboratory 
UVSTAR Ultraviolet Spectrograph Telescope for Astronomical Research 
V  Volt, Voltage 
Verif  Verification 
Vibe   Vibration 
W/  With 
WIRE  Wide-Field Infrared Explorer 
Wrt  With respect to, With regard to 
XARM  X-ray Astronomy Recovery Mission 
 
